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Law As an Affordance: The Devil 
Is in the Vanishing Point(s) 
Mireille Hildebrandt∗ 
Abstract 
This Reply to Critics takes the vantage point of  “affordances” to respond to the reviews of  
five noted scholars of  law, philosophy and political science to Smart Technologies and the End(s) 
of  Law: Novel Entanglements of  Law and Philosophy. The reply interacts with the points made, 
by revisiting the dependencies between law and its technological embodiment, insisting that 
we cannot take for granted that the upcoming onlife world of  preemptive computing will 
“afford” a Rule of  Law that safeguards the testability and contestability of  subliminal deci-
sion-making, without, however, falling prey to economic, political, social or even 
technological determinism. 
I.  Introduction 
Let’s face it: (1) the difference between the onlife and the “real” world is a matter of af-
fordances (re Brownsword), (2) there is no overarching theory of affordances in my book; 
instead, the notion helps to summarize some of its inspirations and also explains why blue-
prints to solve the problems are not the focus of this book (re Calo), (3) rights as capabilities 
(on the side of human agents) indeed depend on rights as affordances (on the side of the 
data driven environment) (re Cohen), and (4) affordances often depend to a large extent on 
the default settings of an agent’s environment (re Kerr), while (5) affordances also shape our 
capabilities to form resilient and if need be resistant publics (re Raab).  
Smart Technologies and the End(s) of Law (The End(s) )1 could be interpreted as an in-
verted pyramid resting on Gibson’s insightful work on affordances, claiming and arguing 
for the importance of investigating and reconfiguring the affordances of our new algo-
rithmic world. However, as I am a lawyer and a philosopher, The End(s) is informed by 
legal theory and philosophy of technology, rather than information science (which Calo 
believes to be my disciplinary background) or ecological psychology (the origin of the 
concept of affordances). I am not sure it would be wise to put all one’s eggs in one basket, 
                                                 
∗ Mireille Hildebrandt is a tenured Research Professor at the Faculty of  Law and Criminology, research 
group for Law Science Technology and Society studies (LSTS) at Vrije Universiteit Brussel and holds a part-
time Chair on Smart Environments, data protection and the Rule of  Law at the Science Faculty, institute of  
Computing and Information Sciences (iCIS) at Radboud University, Nijmegen, the Netherlands. See her 
personal website at https://works.bepress.com/mireille_hildebrandt/.  
1 Mireille Hildebrandt, Smart Technologies and the End(s) of  Law (2015) [hereinafter The End(s)]; see also 
the reviews by Kyle McGee, On Legal Replicants, 56 Jurimetrics 305 (2016); Bernard Keenan, Book Review, 
79 Mod. L. Rev. 733 (2016); Matthew Jewell, Book Review, 13 SCRIPTed 215 (2016); Bart van der Sloot, 
Book Review, 1 Eur. Data Protection L. Rev. 157 (2015). 
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when it comes to investigating the sustainability of legal protection in the age of data driv-
en anything. The argument in the book instigates from a loosely woven and thereby 
hopefully flexible and resistant theoretical framework, building on a philosophy of tech-
nology and law that takes matter as seriously as it minds the mind. It would therefore be 
more precise to say that the book forms the top of a pyramid, based on an “intellectual 
macramé” (Kerr, in this issue) that weaves together a resilient foundation for the argu-
ment that is presented. My preferred metaphor here would be a trampoline, as I believe 
that in the end “nothing is as practical as good theory.”  
As with a trampoline, good theory should act as a resilient springboard that is also 
a landing place, rather than acting as the result of handicraft that serves no other purpose 
than keeping us busy or decorating our inner mind with complicated intellectualisms. This 
also entails that good theory should not be a straitjacket, built on a single scheme that is 
conveniently applicable to anything and everything, as it pushes and massages whatever it 
encounters into the corset of the model it professes. Such modeling is risky,2 as any mod-
el—being a reduction—will render part of reality illegible. That is not necessarily a 
drawback. On the contrary; it is what makes modeling productive. It does, however, entail 
that blind spots can only be detected by taking multiple perspectives.3  
Any book—and the approach it stands for—has a vanishing point. The invisible 
place that determines its points of view, hiding as a utopian perspective: a u-topos or “view 
from nowhere.”4 A colleague of mine, a computer scientist, told me that the core concept 
of my book is “affordance,” though he was not entirely sure what it meant.5 As Calo 
rightly notes, The End(s) does not develop an overarching theory based on a single con-
cept. Nevertheless, the concept is of prime importance and informs the central argument, 
even if it is not intended to stand on its own, and should rather help to sensitize the read-
er to a set of concepts that emphasize the dependencies between the information and 
communication infrastructures (ICIs) and human agency, which they enable and constrain. In 
more philosophical terms, the book investigates the emerging ICI that co-constitutes and co-
                                                 
2 Even lawyers and philosophers can learn from some of  the great minds in information science: Claudio 
Ciborra, Digital Technologies and the Duality of  Risk (2004). 
3 This is what F. Scott Fitzgerald seems to say in his On Booze (2011): “[T]he test of  a first-rate intelligence is the 
ability to hold two opposed ideas in the mind at the same time, and still retain the ability to function.” Id. at 11. 
4 Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (1986). 
5 The concept is not part of  our common sense, but explained in The End(s) as “the types of  behaviours 
that a specific environment makes possible for an organism. In this book: the types of  behaviours that a 
specific socio-technical infrastructure (STI) ‘affords,’ i.e., makes possible or impossible for the agents that 
employ it.” Hildebrandt, The End(s), supra note 1, at 260. Further explanation can be found throughout The 
End(s). See, e.g., id. at 146 (relating the concept to Deleuze’s “agencement”—usually translated as 
“assembly”—and Varela’s “enaction”) & 170-71 (discussing the difference between Gibson’s original and 
Norman’s derived usage of  “affordance”). The concept is vernacular in design studies, based on Norman’s 
focus on visible affordances. Computer science does not think in terms of  affordances, and would actually 
fit better with James Gibson’s original concept, as this emphasizes hidden as well as obvious affordances 
(especially relevant where computer science is focused on digital security, e.g., attacker models). See Donald 
A. Norman, Affordance, Conventions, and Design, 6(3) Interactions 38 (1999) & James J. Gibson, The 
Ecological Approach to Visual Perception (1986). 
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regulates6 human self, mind and society.7 It takes a post-cognitivist perspective, without 
necessarily being anti-cognitivist.8 
Other core concepts that inform the book are those of “data driven agency,” “dig-
ital unconscious” and “onlife world.” The latter refers to the increasing artificiality of the 
distinction between online and offline.9 Speaking of an onlife world emphasizes that tech-
niques such as machine learning transform our life world (Welt) as their predictions and 
pre-emptions envelop us like an external “digital unconscious.” Our new onlife world 
confronts us with an abundance of mindless, data driven agents that feed on our behav-
ioral data, resulting in a data driven environment that is always in the process of figuring 
us out, predicting or even pre-empting our next move. In that sense, our inorganic envi-
ronment seems to incorporate new artificial life forms, turning our offline world online as 
well as onlife.  
In effect, “data driven agency,” “the onlife world” and the “digital unconscious” 
make for three more vanishing points, providing alternative inroads into the argument of 
the book. A landscape with multiple vanishing points cannot exist in two-dimensional 
space (unless your name is Escher),10 so the book indeed invites the reader to take multi-
ple perspectives within a multidimensional space. I will frame this reply, however, with 
the concept of affordances, since the book basically inquires into what data driven agency 
affords human beings and human society, while exploring how law may sustain both its 
instrumentality and its protection in the face of an ICI with radically novel affordances.  
II. Modern Law and the Rule of Law as an Affordance  
of Written and Printed Text 
The core thesis of the book can be found in chapters 7 and 8 and can be explained as fol-
lows. The plasticity of our brains enabled the invention of human language, its expression 
and externalization in writing and reading.11 This in turn afforded abstract thought,12 further 
                                                 
6 About the—originally Kantian—distinction between constitution and regulation, further developed in the 
context of  speech act theory by Austin and Searle and for law by MacCormick, see Mireille Hildebrandt, 
The Force of  Law and the Force of  Technology, in The Routledge International Handbook of  Technology, 
Crime and Justice 597 (M.R.P. McGuire & Thomas J. Holt eds., 2017).  
7 Such a relational conception of  human agency has been developed by American pragmatist Mead, see 
George Herbert Mead & Charles William Morris, Mind, Self, and Society from the Standpoint of  a Social 
Behaviorist (1962), which had a major influence on sociologists such as Goffman, Parsons and Luhmann. 
8 See the exchange between Tim Parks and Riccardo Manzotti, The Ice Cream Problem, N.Y. Rev. Books, 
Jan. 26, 2017, http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2017/01/26/consciousness-the-ice-cream-problem/. On 
engaging cognitivist psychology see Mireille Hildebrandt, Autonomic and Autonomous “Thinking”: 
Preconditions for Criminal Accountability, Law, Human Agency and Autonomic Computing 141 (Mireille 
Hildebrandt & Antoinette Rouvroy eds., 2011). 
9 Luciano Floridi, The Onlife Manifesto: Being Human in a Hyperconnected Era (2014). 
10 Notably in M.C. Escher’s “Three Intersecting Planes.” See Bruno Ernst (Hans de Rijk), M.C. Escher’s 
Legacy: A Centennial Celebration (“Selection Is Distortion”), Impossible Worlds, http://im-
possible.info/english/articles/eschers-legacy/bruno-ernst-selection-is-distortion.html.  
11 Walter Ong, Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of  the Word (1982). 
Hildenrandt — Law As an Affordance 119 
 
developing with the proliferation of the printing press and all the institutions built upon 
written and printed documentation, such as our educational system, public administration, 
economic markets and, last but not least, modern law.13 In other words, law-as-we-know-it 
is an affordance of a specific ICI; it is neither entirely determined nor caused by this ICI, 
but the “force of positive law” depends on it. This “force of law” has some very specific 
characteristics, such as a division of labor between those who enact law and those who in-
terpret and apply it, which has resulted in the complex system of checks and balances that 
informs the Rule of Law. The latter includes a series of individual rights that enable legal 
subjects to speak law to power, resisting attempts to impose a rule by law (by man). Modern law 
is thus an affordance of the printing press and the ensuing proliferation of text. In turn, 
modern law has specific affordances that may, however, depend on an ICI that can no long-
er be taken for granted as the prevalent architecture of human society. My concern sits with 
the fact that the affordances of modern law depend on the affordances of human language 
and the proliferation of text. There is no reason to assume (as most of the reviewers seem 
to do)14 that these affordances will survive the transition to computational language and the 
proliferation of preemptive computing. To ensure that legal protection is sustainable we 
should therefore assess the novel ICI and reconfigure it in ways that afford such protec-
tion.15 This calls for keen attention to the defaults of the ICIs that “run” the onlife world 
(see Kerr in this issue). Simultaneously, we need to assess what tasks (now performed by 
lawyers) we can delegate to data driven agents, reconfiguring the division of tasks between 
legal norms and what Brownsword calls “technological management.”16 
                                                                                                                                             
12 Hildebrandt, The End(s), supra note 1, § 3.3.1. On the relationship between written language and abstract 
thought, see id. § 4.4. & James Gleick, The Information: A History, a Theory, a Flood ch. 2 (1st ed. 2010). 
13 In this sense institutionalization is a matter of  reification, i.e., the fabrication of  stable expectations as to 
how certain transhuman entities will behave (corporations, schools, governmental agencies). Many 
institutions are shaped, reinforced and maintained by the performative force of  the law (legal effect is to a 
large extent based on what Austin and Searle describe in their speech act theory, on what Peirce explains in 
his semiotics and pragmatism, and on what Wittgenstein denotes language games, namely the performative 
dimension of  the “life world” or “life forms” that envelop human interaction. See Peter Winch, The Idea of  a 
Social Science (1958). It is pivotal to understand that the force of  law does not reduce to logic, physical force 
or mechanical application, but —first and foremost—builds on the role of  language (langue) and language 
usage (parole) in making out what counts as a marriage, a corporation, a school, or a criminal court. See also Paul 
Ricoeur, The Model of  the Text: Meaningful Action Considered as a Text, 5 New Lit. Hist. 91 (1973).  
14 Brownsword cautiously assumes that some room will be left for the law; Calo does not explain whether 
law as an affordance of  future ICIs will offer the kind of  affordances modern law provides; Cohen 
professes that a “rule of  law prime” will survive in the era of  smart infrastructures (I agree it might, but 
depending on how we reset their defaults); Kerr believes we must either accept that smart technologies 
could undermine the essence of  the rule of  law or work to reset their defaults (I think we need to 
acknowledge the first to ascertain the urgency of  the need to perform the second); Raab, however, pushes for 
an argument based on political theory as what might save us from sleepwalking into a brave new onlife world. 
15 This argument is similar to Helen Nissenbaum’s argument for a decision heuristic for contextual integrity; 
see Helen Fay Nissenbaum, Privacy in Context: Technology, Policy, and the Integrity of  Social Life (2010); 
Michael Herrmann et al., Privacy in Location-Based Services: An Interdisciplinary Approach, 13 SCRIPTed 
144 (2016). It also closely aligns with the legal obligation to implement a data protection impact assessment 
and—if  necessary—data protection by design.  
16 Roger Brownsword, Technological Management and the Rule of  Law, 8 Law, Innovation & Tech. 100 (2016).  
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III.  Matters of Concern (re Brownsword) 
Roger Brownsword has written extensively on the idea of code as law, providing a salient 
criticism of Lessig’s suggestion that code and law are two—seemingly interchangeable—
ways of regulating society.17 Brownsword speaks of smart technologies and law as “regula-
tory rivals.” One of his points has been that—other than code, market forces or social 
engineering—law provides us with the choice between obedience to and violation of legal 
norms that have been explicitly articulated. This choice feeds on and contributes to the de-
velopment of moral agency, of “doing the right thing for the right reason” instead of 
merely being forced or nudged by a technical infrastructure. Brownword has proposed 
and argued for a triple bottom line that should underpin the social contract of any society 
of moral human agents, requiring that we only accept new technologies insofar as they 
preserve, protect and promote this triple bottom line: “(1) the essential conditions for 
human existence (given human biological needs), (2) the generic conditions for human 
self-development and agency, and (3) the essential conditions for the development and 
practice of moral agency” (Brownsword, in this issue). His concern is that an onlife world 
that is built on preemptive computing could help us do the “right” thing without even 
bothering about the reason, thus reducing both our agency and our moral agency.  
In his review Brownsword engages with great acuity with the narrative introduc-
tion of The End(s), iterating a series of pivotal questions: what if personal digital 
assistants perform better than humans? how does artificial agency affect human agency? 
can we take autonomy for granted? is autonomy a matter of choice and control? what 
about the right not to know? He raises these questions to highlight how and why smart 
technologies should be everyone’s concern and why especially jurists are faced with the 
question of how to safeguard the core tenets of moral community and human dignity in 
the face of increasing “technological management.” There are, however, three conten-
tions that I would not entirely agree with. First, he suggests that “difficulties for agents 
who want to understand how they look through the eyes of fellow agents . . . is surely 
not the major cause for concern,” second, he assumes that the core of the Rule of Law 
is formed by rules, and third, he opposes general utility and individual justice as if this is 
necessarily a zero-sum game. My emphasis on our double contingency (our mutual an-
ticipation of how we are anticipated) is not a matter of vanity or reputation 
management. It regards another level of analysis, highlighting the relational nature of 
self-constitution, meaning that the self as a self-conscious subject is born in the process 
of anticipating what others seem to expect from us, as in “how others will read our ac-
tions and intentions.”18 This goes with an “expectancy theory of norms,” including legal 
norms,19 which implies that legal norms cannot be reduced to rules but must be seen in 
                                                 
17 Roger Brownsword, Rights, Regulation, and the Technological Revolution (2008); Lawrence Lessig, Code 
Version 2.0 (2006). 
18 Hildebrandt, The End(s), supra note 1, at 15, 53-54, 67, 93, 222-23, 261. 
19 J.F.G. Glastra van Loon, Rules and Commands, LXVII (268) Mind 1 (1958). 
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the context of an underlying web of principles and policies that inform the meaning and 
application of the rule.20 This also means that doing justice in individual cases is always 
and also matter of general utility, being both more and less than an aggregate of slices of 
individual justice, as individual justice (in)forms the expectations and thereby the au-
thority of the law. His reference to the English case of CCN Systems Ltd v. Data Protection 
Registrar demonstrates that courts indeed consider individual justice as something that 
cannot be overruled by a statistical argument that claims to provide a more cost-
effective insurance. The opposition here is not public benefit versus individual justice, 
but the distribution of public benefit.  
In the end, Brownsword frames the challenge of smart technologies by observ-
ing that “[t]he domain of legal rules is set to shrink,” thus taking “stock of the changing 
complexion of the regulatory environment.” This is indeed one of the crucial challenges 
we face; rather than rejecting “technological management” we should (1) acknowledge 
that it does not equate with law, but rather with public administration or corporate 
nudging and (2) acknowledge that the crucial question is about when this may be good 
thing and when it decapitates either democratic decision-making or human autonomy—
or both. 
IV. Overarching Theory and Policy Blueprints (re Calo) 
Ryan Calo is one of the very few lawyers who has written about law in terms of af-
fordances.21 As a lawyer, I believe this is pivotal in times when (1) law as an affordance as 
well as (2) the affordances of the law are on the verge of radical change. For some reason Calo 
believes, however, that I would “bristle” at his seeing law as an affordance or as providing 
a set of affordances. He finds that “Hildebrandt does not go so far as to characterize law 
as an affordance” and worries that I could equate seeing law as an affordance (of what?) 
with instrumentalization. Throughout The End(s) I argue that lawyers should acknowledge 
that law is an affordance of the information and communication infrastructures (ICIs) of 
our societies; this is the central thesis of the book: “law is not technologically neutral and 
necessarily shares the affordances of its embodiment.”22  
Understanding modern law as an affordance of the ICI of writing and printing 
implies that I reject the view that law is merely an instrument of policy making or regula-
tion (this would be instrumentalism).23 I do argue, however, that law is an instrument to 
achieve the public good (law’s purposiveness). My point is that it should simultaneously pro-
tect individual rights and freedoms; law’s instrumentality should not be opposed to its 
protection.24 Instrumentalism assumes a neutral conception of law, where law can be re-
                                                 
20 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (1991). 
21 Ryan Calo, Can Americans Resist Surveillance?, 83 U. Chi. L. Rev. 23 (2016). 
22 See Hildebrandt, The End(s), supra note 1, at 174; see also id. at xiii, 17, § 8.2.4 (building on § 3.3.1). 
23 See id. § 8.2.2. 
24 See id. § 8.2.4. 
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placed by other instruments if these turn out to be more effective or efficient. Instrumen-
tality assumes a relational understanding of law, where law cannot be replaced by techno-
regulation or nudging without changing the nature of the goals to be achieved.25  
As described in chapters 7 and 8, modern law, as an affordance of a specific ICI, 
in turn affords subjective rights that offer legal protection against government intrusions or 
unfair treatment, based on a specific understanding of legality. Building on the work of 
Magnani and Bertolotti26 one could frame modern law as a “cognitive niche” that, e.g., 
“affords” human beings privacy, freedom of expression, freedom of contract and the cre-
ation of economic markets (to name but a few of modern law’s affordances). The 
question I try to raise in The End(s) is whether the upcoming ICI of preemptive computing would 
afford a law with similar affordances, or—instead—reduce law to public administration and 
private negotiation. Based on the legal protection offered by current—text-based—law, I 
propose and argue that we cannot take the future of law for granted in the upcoming era 
of computational regulation.  
Three more points made by Calo invite a reply. First, Data Protection by Design 
(DPbD) and Legal Protection by Design (LPbD) are not close cousins, as he suggests. 
Rather, DPbD is an instance of LPbD. Other than Privacy by Design, which is a matter 
of policy or ethics, DPbD imposes a legal obligation that can generate private law liabil-
ity or administrative fines under EU law. One can easily imagine other instances of 
LPbD, such as a legal obligation to prevent prohibited discrimination by design (by 
means of discrimination-aware datamining) or a legal obligation to ensure the presump-
tion of innocence by design (by implementing specific defaults at the level of the ICT 
architecture for smart policing). The concept of LPbD was developed in counterpoint 
to the concept of techno-regulation, emphasizing a series of requirements, notably 
democratic legitimation, the possibility of disobedience or resistance, transparency and 
publicity of the legal norm that is imposed, and contestability in a court of law. These 
requirements are not necessarily part of techno-regulation or other “by design” solu-
tions. DPbD is not a matter of policy advice; it has force of law within the EU 
(applicable from May 2018) and as an example of LPbD it deserves to be situated in the 
context of the central argument of the book. As clarified in chapter 10, it is not a pana-
cea for the challenges posed by the onlife world. Law is never a panacea; its role is to 
enable people and societies to develop resilience and a good life, not to impose the pre-
ferred road to the good life of the ruling majority. This is where democracy depends on 
the Rule of Law, as Dworkin has demonstrated, effectively requiring equal respect and 
                                                 
25 My rejection of  instrumentalism involves a recognition of  the instrumentality of  law that fits with, e.g., 
Dewey’s pragmatist understanding of  language, which aligns well with the idea of  affordances. Both 
highlight the mutual dependencies between organism and environment, highlighting that means and ends 
cannot be separated. Cf. John Dewey, The Logic of  Judgments of  Practice, in Essays in Experimental Logic 
335 (1916). The difference between instrumentalism and instrumentality has been developed saliently by R. 
Foqué & A.C. ‘t Hart, Instrumentaliteit en rechtsbescherming (1990). 
26 Tommaso Bertolotti & Lorenzo Magnani, Theoretical Considerations on Cognitive Niche Construction, 
Synthese 1 (2016). 
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concern for each individual person.27 Democracy is not equivalent with majority rule; it 
entails that majorities rule in a way that allows minorities to become majorities. The 
strength of EU DPbD is indeed that it provides an open norm that invites different 
ways of achieving compliance and different ways of respecting the fundamental right to 
data protection.  
The second point concerns my reference to Odysseus and the Sirens. Tying one-
self to the mast is, unlike Calo suggests, not the crux. The point is that ears had to be 
waxed, to prevent an executive order to untie the hero from being heard. In my argument, 
Odysseus is not the hero—I don’t believe in Herculean superiority. The system of checks 
and balances is the “hero.” We need an ICI that does not require heroic effort to safe-
guard equal respect and concern. Law is not ethics, but it should enable people, 
companies and government agencies to act ethically. For instance, rigorous pseudony-
mization, with keen attention to key management, is one way to make sure that Odysseus 
can hear the Sirens, without having a chance to be lured into data or pattern abuse. This is 
precisely what EU data protection law requires: state of the art protection, depending on 
the risks at stake. EU law should not and does not prohibit research on big data, it does 
require testable and contestable methodologies, whenever the fundamental right to data 
protection is at stake. It aims for legitimate data harvesting while preventing silly data 
hoarding.  
Third point: seemingly spurious correlations do not necessarily hold the “key to 
unlocking enormous commercial, health and other value,” as Calo claims; they may lead 
us astray.28 Their costs—in terms of manipulability—are evident, but their benefits are 
not. We should stop assuming such benefit and start working on it. My argument is that 
this requires a methodological integrity that is often overlooked (by unreliable consultants 
and those who buy into their game; not by academic data scientists). My concomitant ar-
gument for purpose limitation is aligned with a goodbye to data pseudo-science. My point 
is not that we should overlook the “wondrous potential of advances in data science” that 
Calo hails, but rather that we should acknowledge the hard work required for effective 
and reliable data science, which includes iterant reflection on purpose, data cleansing, test-
ing of different data sets, different algorithms and a profound awareness that building on 
spurious correlations can cause havoc to our critical infrastructures (whether in health, 
finance, energy or “fake” news). I am sure that Calo will not disagree here, as we share an 
interest in making data science work in a way that “affords” protection of fundamental 
legal protection.  
 
                                                 
27 Dworkin, supra note 20. 
28 James Kobielus, Big Data’s Bogus Correlations, IBM Big Data & Analytics Hub, 
http://www.ibmbigdatahub.com/blog/big-datas-bogus-correlations. On the epistemology of  big data 
research, e.g., John Symons & Ramón Alvarado, Can We Trust Big Data? Applying Philosophy of  Science to 
Software, 3 Big Data & Society (2016). 
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V.  “Bromides About the Primacy of  
Social Shaping Will not Suffice”29 (re Cohen) 
Julie Cohen’s review is written with an acuity that not only “gets the point” of The End(s) 
but also takes it from there, developing new inroads into the central argument, lining up 
with other attempts to deepen our understanding of effective human rights protection. 
She provides salient examples of how liberties, capabilities and affordances play out in 
achieving the substance of human rights, notably freedom of association. The examples 
underline how the rights discourse has operated on what she terms “a set of unstated and 
often unexamined assumptions about the built environment’s properties” (both in terms 
of constraint and lack of constraint), demonstrating that we need to visit these assump-
tions, and encompass what she denotes as “the architectural” in our discourse on rights.  
When discussing the capability approach to human rights, Cohen shows its added 
value compared to the liberty approach, noting that capabilities require checking whether 
individuals are in a position to make use of the opportunities on offer, which depends—
amongst others—on the socio-economic infrastructure. I would argue, however, that this 
also depends on the socio-technical infrastructure. The affordances approach therefore 
adds insights by investigating to what extent a socio-technical-economic architecture has 
unfair distributive effects on liberties and capabilities. One could say that rights as liberties 
require keen attention to the actual capabilities of individual persons, which in turn de-
pend on the affordances of their institutional, economic and technical environment 
(which can be distinguished analytically but do not lead separate “lives”). Capabilities and 
affordances are thus two sides of the same coin, because both are grounded in a relational 
understanding of the human person. They are, nevertheless, different sides, taking the 
perspective of the subject (capabilities) or the environment (affordances). Since there is 
no subject without an environment that co-determines its capabilities and no environment 
without an agent whose environment it is, taking rights seriously means taking seriously 
that law itself has specific affordances that constrain and/or enable human capabilities 
(which is Calo’s main point). My point is that these affordances depend on the ICI that 
roots legal articulation.  
Cohen foregrounds my argument for a “right to co-determine how we will be 
read,” together with her own salient argument for a right to “semantic discontinuity,” 
which can be achieved by Paul Ohm and Jonathan Frankle’s “desirable inefficiency,” or 
by what Luciano Floridi has called “ontological friction,” by what Gloria Gonsalez Fuster 
coined a “right to inaccuracy,” and what Finn Brunton and Helen Nissenbaum coined 
“obfuscation.”30 As should be clear, this is all about “not being read,” rather than “co-
                                                 
29 Cohen, in this issue. 
30 Hildebrandt, The End(s), supra note 1, at 102-03; Julie E. Cohen, Configuring the Networked Self: Law, 
Code, and the Play of  Everyday Practice (2012); Gloria González Fuster, Inaccuracy as a Privacy-Enhancing 
Tool, 12 Ethics & Information Tech. 87 (2010); Luciano Floridi, The Ontological Interpretation of  
Informational Privacy, 7 Ethics & Information Tech. 185 (2005); Finn Brunton & Helen Nissenbaum, 
Obfuscation: A User’s Guide for Privacy and Protest (2015). Ohm and Frankle’s paper is referenced by 
Cohen in this issue; it is not yet publicly available. 
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determining how one is read.” The latter is not obvious and will require us to reinvent 
ourselves through the reconfiguration of the technologies that shape us while we shape 
them. This relates to whether we will find ways to uphold the rule of law. Cohen and my-
self do not disagree on whether smart technologies will disable legality (neither of us are 
determinist), but on whether they might (which cannot be ruled out, precisely because we 
are not determinist). My take is that this requires more than a right “not to be read,” ne-
cessitating ways and means to counter—and play with—the subliminal modulation of our 
environment.31 Whether we will succeed here may depend on the extent to which we will 
proceed to effectively require private and public actors to give reasons for their automated deci-
sions,32 thus potentially disrupting their ability to base such decisions on opaque, untestable 
and uncontestable machine learning. 
VI. The Tectonic Shift in the Nature of Shifting Defaults (re Kerr) 
Only lawyers know that a double negation is not the same as an affirmation.33 Logicians 
who believe in the law of the excluded middle will frown upon such frivolous duplication. 
Ian Kerr bets a golden fiddle that I would not disagree that the threats of smart technolo-
gies are “less of a reason in favor of understanding that modern law’s default mode of 
existence is in jeopardy” than “an illustration of exactly why the Rule of Law provides a 
reason against permitting or precluding particular defaults . . . .” (emphasis in original). 
Kerr probably knows that whereas I may not disagree, I would not agree either. Unlike 
Kerr I believe that modern law’s mode of existence, which is preconditional for the Rule 
of Law, is indeed under threat and will have to be reinvented to make sure that the default 
affordances of our ICIs do not undermine or simply preclude the institutional checks and 
balances that enable people to speak law to power.34 
This is a tall order, but—I believe—entirely doable. It basically means that law 
makers should investigate whether and when enacting written legal code suffices when 
they are “making law,” and when law making requires the institution of specific computer 
architectures with particular defaults in order to ensure that the force of law is not frus-
trated, mechanized or dissipated. Such defaults can be built into the hardware, the 
firmware and the software of computing systems, providing various levels of interaction 
with such defaults. In the hardware the defaults are hidden from ordinary human vision 
and will in point of fact be mandatory. In the firmware they may be more or less hidden 
                                                 
31 Cf. Cohen, supra note 30. 
32 E.g., Bryce Goodman & Seth Flaxman, European Union Regulations on Algorithmic Decision-Making 
and a “Right to Explanation,” arXiv:1606.08813 [Cs, Stat] (2016), http://arxiv.org/abs/1606.08813. Mireille 
Hildebrandt, The Dawn of  a Critical Transparency Right for the Profiling Era, Digital Enlightenment 
Yearbook 2012, at 41 (2012). 
33 This is an overstatement; Simon Stern kindly referred me to a similar capability in linguists: Laurence R. 
Horn, A Natural History of  Negation (1989), which confirms that law is text, after all. 
34 Jeremy Waldron, The Rule of  International Law, 30 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 15, 27 & n.28 (2006) 
(citing Richard B. Bilder & Detlev F. Vagts, Speaking Law to Power: Lawyers and Torture, 98 Am. J. Int’l 
L. 689 (2004)). 
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and hard to tinker with. In the software default settings may open the floor for reconfigu-
ration and individual intervention, if the default configuration protects against 
unwarranted intrusion or power imbalances. In short, I believe that Kerr’s emphasis on 
the primacy of defaults is pivotal and one of the crucial challenges here will indeed be to 
fabricate defaults that allow us to detect “how we are being read” by data driven decision 
(support) systems.  
Holmes professed that “the life of the law is not logic, but experience,”35 and 
therefore smart technologies could be both a threat and a treat for the law. These tech-
nologies are based on machine learning (ML), which has been defined as “improving task 
T, in terms of performance measure P, based on experience E.”36 ML is not just a matter 
of programming (logic), it is a matter of learning, of experience. There we have an affinity 
between ML and the law. Kerr has written a salient chapter37 on Holmes’s definition of 
law as “the prophecy of what the courts will decide,”38 arguing that whereas Holmes pre-
sented law as a prediction machine for those subject to the law, the upcoming architecture 
of prediction machines does not inform individual persons but first and foremost informs 
commercial enterprise and government agencies. In that sense, preemptive computing 
systems invert the logic of the law, which is meant to provide an effective understanding 
of how one’s actions will be interpreted under the rule of law, enabling one to foresee the 
consequences of such actions, making it possible to plan and have a life.  
The onlife world may—instead—foster an environment capable of predicting the 
behaviors of those subject to law, enabling their environment to foresee the consequences 
of specific interventions, making it possible to preempt such behavior—without such sub-
jects having a clue as to how they may be manipulated. Whether it will come to that, how 
far this will erode human agency and to what extent this will be the end of law as we know 
it, is unclear yet. The jury is still out on this one. In that sense, I do not disagree with Kerr 
that law could reconfigure the force of law by requiring specific technical and organizational 
defaults, thus preserving and reinventing the checks and balances of the rule of law. But I 
disagree that we can rule out failure to achieve this. It will be a matter of hard work and 
close collaboration between lawyers and those who design, engineer, develop and engineer 
our new, onlife world. I bet a golden fiddle that Kerr does not disagree.  
VII. All Is Politics, but Politics Is Not All (re Raab) 
In his magnificent tour de force, Charles Raab highlights the stamina I seem to expect 
from those visiting my book (note that books are supposedly read, whereas websites are 
visited). The visiting reader is challenged by twists and turns, vistas and vertigo, while en-
                                                 
35 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of  the Law, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 991 (1997). 
36 Thomas Mitchell, Machine Learning (1997). 
37 Ian Kerr, Prediction, Preemption, Presumption: The Path of  Law After the Computational Turn, in 
Privacy, Due Process and the Computational Turn: The Philosophy of  Law Meets the Philosophy of  
Technology 91 (Mireille Hildebrandt & Katja de Vries eds., 2013). 
38 Holmes, supra note 35. 
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couraged to traverse cultural and disciplinary universes, multiple scales and levels of ab-
straction that overlap and interact with each other. Raab calls for more concrete 
approaches to solve the problems described, or more concrete depictions of the solutions 
presented. He is particularly interested in the institutional issues, the division of tasks and 
roles where it comes to legal protection by design. He raises a number of pivotal ques-
tions as to whether “by design” can do the job, how this should be envisaged, by whom, 
based on what negotiations and power play. In other work, I have commented on this in 
terms of whether we can be “saved by design,”39 highlighting that legal protection by de-
sign is driven by a very specific concern. Not merely by that of legal certainty but also by 
the interaction between legal certainty and less flexible attempts to impose certainty, while 
foregrounding that law aims for more than stable expectations. Law must also target jus-
tice as fairness and must be instrumental in achieving democratically legitimated policy 
objectives that may be incompatible in specific instances with either legal certainty or fair-
ness. The concern of the law is how to compatibilize legal certainty, justice and 
purposiveness, and—if incompatible in specific situations—how to provide countervail-
ing measures to compensate trade-offs. Raab may wish for more concrete recipes or 
handles to come to terms with such arduous tasks. He is right, but that would be the stuff 
of another type of book, notably a book that analyzes the interaction between case law 
and technical defaults, matching legal conditions with technical requirements. Though 
there is some of this in chapters 9 and 10, my first concern here is theoretical—trying to 
develop the trampoline mentioned above, hoping others will employ it to flex their mus-
cles in the context of the onlife world. Theory, here, is not merely modeling or mapping—
it is a matter of structured and iterant reflection,40 of developing a “reflective equilibrium” 
as advocated by John Rawls.41 Theory in that sense is a practice, an exercise, and a learn-
ing process. 
Raab finds that the book is unfinished. Its solutions require work and I cannot but 
wholeheartedly agree. Law and the Rule of Law require hard work, they depend on pro-
fessional lawyers to prepare legislation, to file, prosecute and decide cases. This is an 
everyday affair and any lawyer knows that it requires knowledge of the law, experience in 
its application and an open mind to the vicissitudes of the case brought before them. Law 
does not speak for itself, it needs humans to weave together the legal framework that pro-
tects them and—being rule-bound as well as principled—serves as a springboard for 
long-term planning. My point is that the onlife world demands new collaborations be-
tween lawyers and the architects of the onlife and new sensitivities to the affordances of 
the information and communication infrastructure that determines the operational back-
bone of our onlife world.  
                                                 
39 Mireille Hildebrandt, Saved by Design? The Case of  Legal Protection by Design, in NanoEthics: Studies 
of  New and Emerging Technologies (forthcoming 2017). 
40 Hildebrandt, The End(s), supra note 1, § 2.3.3. 
41 John Rawls, A Theory of  Justice (rev. ed. 1999). 
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Raab claims, also, that the book lacks awareness of the politics that is involved or 
that it refuses to address the political questions raised by and in the onlife environment. I 
don’t think that is a fair criticism, though I agree that this must be further researched. It 
needs another book to be written in the realm of another domain, notably political science 
and political theory (which is not my expertise). I am looking forward to Raab’s further 
work here. However, it should be clear from chapters 7 and 8, tackling the entanglements 
of law and technology, taking a position on the law as the backbone of a fair and open 
society, that the The End(s) has an implied philosophy concerning “the political.” One can 
see the political as a separate realm and politics as a dirty game played by cynical men. In-
stead, the idea of the Rule of Law refers to a political order that is constraint in such a way 
that dirty play is ruled out or mitigated as dirty players are called to account; a political 
order where one power is counterbalanced by another, making sure that we are not ruled 
by men but by a law that can be transformed by those subject to its rule. Rule of law is not 
rule by law by men; it is also not rule by law by machines.  
